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ADVERSARY ADVOCACY AND THE AUTHORITY
OF ADJUDICATION
Daniel Markovits*
INTRODUCTION
Should lawyers detach their professional activities from their personal
factual, legal, and moral views and promote even clients' causes that they
would oppose as citizens and reject as judges or jurors, or should lawyers
constrain the professional services that they provide to suit their personal
views? Should lawyers serve particular clients as partisans, or should they
serve justice writ large? To employ the terms that have brought us together,
should lawyers assist clients in acting like Holmesian bad men, promoting
their private interests as aggressively as the law allows, or should they
encourage clients to honor the law's internal purposes, and indeed impose
these purposes on clients, so that they help clients to secure not as much as
they can get, but only what the law recommends?
The lore of the bar-think of Lord Brougham's remark that a lawyer
should serve his client "by all expedient means" and "reckless of the
consequences," and even though he should "involve his country in
confusion for his client's protection"l'-tends towards the first alternative in
each pair. Moreover, the positive law governing lawyers also elaborates a
partisan conception of lawyers' professional role. Broad and organic
principles of lawyer loyalty2 and client control3 require lawyers zealously to
pursue ends that their clients have wide discretion in setting. In addition, a
broad and organic principle of professional detachment,4 although usually
understood as an effort to shield lawyers from legal or even moral
* Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. 1 Speeches of Henry Lord Brougham 105 (1838), quoted in Lord MacMillan, Law
and Other Things 195 (1937). MacMillan, it should be noted, did not approve of this
extreme position. Nor, incidentally, is it clear that Lord Brougham himself believed what he
said. On the one hand, Brougham intended his extravagant remark as a threat, made during a
dispute, and designed to induce settlement. And he later characterized his statement as
"anything rather than a deliberate and well-considered opinion." See William Forsyth,
Hortensius: An Historical Essay on the Office and Duties of an Advocate 389 n.1 (2d. ed.
1874); see also David J.A. Cairns, Advocacy and the Making of the Adversarial Criminal
Trial, 1800-1865, at 139 (1998). On the other hand, that Brougham made the threat suggests
that whatever he thought in the abstract, he was in fact prepared to throw his country into
confusion for his client's sake.
2. See Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 1.3 (2003).
3. See id. R. 1.2.
4. See id. R. 1.2(b).
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responsibility for their clients' concerns, 5 also acts as a sword to forbid
lawyers from imposing their personal doubts about the merits of claims that
clients nevertheless wish to pursue. 6 To be sure, these duties are ringed
round by constraints on any number of forms of partisan excess-including,
for example, rules that forbid lying to tribunals 7 or assisting fraud, 8 and
bringing frivolous or malicious claims. 9 And lawyers are permitted, and
indeed in some measure encouraged, to counsel clients on the broader legal
and moral implications of the positions that the clients take. 10 But the
constraints that the positive law places on adversary excess are technical
and mechanical and therefore only constrain, and cannot possibly eliminate,
the organic duties towards partisanship. The lawyer's counseling role must
give way to the duties of lawyer loyalty and client control when confronted
with recalcitrant clients. 1 Although I do not argue the point in detail here,
the genetic structure of the positive law of lawyering tends towards
partisanship.
Moreover, the adversary system defense, which has traditionally
dominated theoretical work in legal ethics, 12 roughly supports this account
5. See id.
6. The specific connection to professional detachment here is unconventional. Cases
that draw the connection and criticize lawyers for seeking to impose their private
assessments of clients' cases include: United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1071 (9th
Cir. 1991) (involving a lawyer who "stated that the evidence against [his client] was
overwhelming and that he was not going to insult the jurors' intelligence" and added "that if
they found [the client] guilty they should not 'ever look back' and agonize regarding whether
they had done the right thing"); Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962, 970 (5th Cir. 1970)
(finding a conflict of interest when a lawyer sought aggressively to impose her view of a
client's case over the client's conflicting views); Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp 949 (E.D. Va.
1959) (involving a lawyer who refused to ask a jury to acquit his client); In re Harshey, 740
N.E.2d 851 (Ind. 2001) (involving a lawyer who pressured a client to accept a settlement that
he regarded as reasonable); People v. Lang, 520 P.2d 393, 395-96 (Cal. 1974) (involving a
lawyer who told an appellate court that although his client claimed that the evidence at trial
was insufficient to support a conviction, he did not agree). The cases do not always mention
Rule 1.2 by name.
7. See Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 3.3, 3.4 (2003).
8. See id. R. 1.2(d).
9. See id. R. 3.1.
10. See id. R. 2.1.
11. For example, a lawyer may not force a resistant client to accept a settlement that she
regards as reasonable. See, e.g., In re Harshey, 740 N.E.2d 851. Moreover, the rule that a
lawyer may not impose her private judgment of a client's claim on settlements applies even
outside the immediate shadow of a tribunal. For example, "a lawyer may not ethically break
off negotiations with an opposing party simply because she has doubts about the viability of
her client's case." See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Op. 387
(1994).
12. The adversary system defense is announced by the Model Rules, which observe that
"when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf
of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being done." Model Rules of Prof'I
Conduct pmbl. para. 8 (2003). The adversary system defense also appears in other
prominent statements of the law governing lawyers, for example in the leading treatise on
legal ethics, which claims that "lawyers administer justice in the broadest sense when they
make available to all citizens whatever the law allows, without subjecting the law or their
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of the lawyer's professional role. It proposes that lawyers' partisanship
plays an essential part in an impartially justified moral division of labor-
that competition among partisan advocates concerned exclusively (or at
least primarily) for their clients produces, on balance, the best justice for all.
The adversary system defense proposes, in this way, ingeniously to avoid
the choices from which I began rather than to choose directly between the
alternatives that they describe. Insofar as the defense succeeds, lawyers
best serve the internal purposes of the law by assisting clients in
approaching the law as bad men.
But this argument has repeatedly been shown to be not just mistaken but
simply implausible. To begin with, its factual predicates do not generally
obtain. Even in an ideal legal system, in which the underlying substantive
laws are just and access to legal services is fairly distributed, it remains
uncertain how much partisanship in fact best serves the law's underlying
purposes. Certainly, a lawyer whose aggressive manipulations were on the
verge of successfully subverting these purposes would better serve justice
by stepping back in ways that neither the bar's self-conception nor its
current rules contemplate.13 And the adversary system defense stands on
shakier ground still in nonideal legal systems (and therefore in every actual
legal system), in which substantive laws are not perfectly just and legal
services are not perfectly fairly distributed. When adversary lawyers are
more available to some persons than to others, for example, it becomes
quite incredible that lawyers' adversary loyalty will best serve justice for
all, even only on balance.14
Moreover, the adversary system defense's theoretical predicates also
stand on shaky ground. The aggregative conception of fairness on which
the adversary system defense relies faces challenges from competitor
conceptions, associated with rights-based moral theories, that apply the
demands of fairness separately to every relation between persons. These
theories suggest that a lawyer's preference for her client that violates a
third-party's rights cannot, as the adversary system defense would have it,
be simply offset by benefits that arise elsewhere in the adversary
administration of justice. 15  And accordingly, notwithstanding the
commonplaces of legal ethics, the partisan conception of lawyering remains
in need of a defense.
I shall seek in these pages to offer a new justification for a partisan
conception of legal practice-if not for lawyers' unreservedly adopting the
client's objectives to any kind of 'moral filter' of their own design." I Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr. & William Hodes, The Law ofLawyering § 1.2:301, at 36 (2d ed. 1990 Supp. 1996).
13. This point is powerfully developed in William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice: A
Theory of Lawyers' Ethics (1998).
14. Even the recitation of the adversary system defense in the Model Rules stipulates
that the opposing party be "well represented." Model Rules of Prof I Conduct pmbl. para. 8
(2003).
15. See generally Arthur Isak Applbaum, Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles
in Public and Personal Life (1999); David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study
(1988).
2006] 1369
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
bad man view of the law, then at least for their remaining substantially
professionally detached from their private views of their clients' claims and
certainly forbidden from imposing their private views (including of the
law's internal purposes) over the objections or even reluctance of clients.
Whereas the traditional adversary system defense is fundamentally an
exercise in moral theory, this new argument will proceed in a self-
consciously political mode and will turn on a freestanding idea of political
legitimacy, which is qualitatively distinct from moral ideals, including even
justice and its cognates.
I shall argue that partisan client-centered rather than impartial justice-
centered lawyers are necessary for the legitimacy of adjudication (and
indeed for the broader practices of applying general laws to particular
cases). And although I shall not seek to establish the precise metes and
bounds of the partisanship that legitimacy requires lawyers to display--or
to ask how the positive law of lawyering stands with respect to the
argument that I develop-it will be apparent that the required partisanship
is substantial. Certainly, and for present purposes most importantly, it will
be clear that although there are many things that lawyers may not do
(including perhaps many things that they currently do do), legitimacy
demands that lawyers whose clients pursue contrary aims sometimes
restrain their own sense of what the law, sympathetically interpreted,
requires. 16
The defense of partisanship that I propose will not extend to all
characteristically lawyerly activities-judges, after all, are lawyers too, as
are many arbitrators and other third party neutrals.' 7 And the case for
partisanship will be stronger as lawyers' activities move nearer to
addressing externally imposed resolutions of their clients' claims-because
this is when the legitimacy of such resolutions is most insistently in need of
a defense. Litigation, of course, represents the central example of such a
case, but other activities, even those at some distance from litigation, also
implicate the authority of the state's mechanisms for applying law to
resolve disputes. Settlement negotiations most obviously proceed in the
shadow of litigated outcomes, as do many regulatory matters. And even
when lawyers are engaged as counselors, before any specific dispute has
been joined, clients arrange their affairs against the backdrop of what they
believe the law will allow, so that even here the law's legitimacy is
16. Moreover, although the specific rules that I mention here are distinctively American,
the basic idea of adversary adjudication is not and receives a wide range of developments
outside the United States. Indeed, it is important to note that adversary adjudication, as I am
construing it here, does not necessarily stand in contrast to systems of dispute resolution
commonly called inquisitorial. Although a contrast is commonly drawn between adversary
and inquisitorial procedure, that contrast principally refers to the legal system's allocation of
control over evidence (whether evidence is developed by disputants or by tribunals) and not
to the division of labor that I am emphasizing between parties and advocates on the one hand
and tribunals on the other.
17. The positive law recognizes this role for lawyers. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct
R. 2.4 (2003).
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implicated. The defense of lawyerly partisanship that I propose obviously
does not extend to the case in which a client asks her lawyer for advice
concerning the law's internal purposes (rather than for assistance in
pursuing her private interests), and so the argument obviously will not rule
out a justice-centered approach to some of lawyers' professional activities.
But although I again do not seek to identify the argument's precise scope
here, it will again be plain that the defense of adversary partisanship (if it
succeeds) extends far beyond the bounds of litigation proper. Certainly, it
will be de-legitimating for a lawyer to counsel her personal views when
doing so causes clients to doubt her loyalties and approach her as an arm of
the state.
One final point is worth noting, which I include because, although I will
not revisit the matter in the larger argument, it is important (especially
nowadays). The defense of partisanship that I develop here does not apply
in any natural way, and probably does not apply at all, to lawyers for the
government. The government, after all, is not an ordinary disputant who
confronts the authority of the state (through litigation or in some other way)
but is, rather, itself in authority. Accordingly, an argument that bases the
case for partisanship on the contribution loyal advocates make to
legitimating the law in application does not extend to cases in which the law
is applied to the government. Government lawyers, it seems to me, should
more or less always pursue justice rather than seeking the most that the
government can get away with. 18
I. Two APPROACHES TO POLITICAL LEGITIMACY
The fundamental problem of politics is that people come into conflict
about how their collective affairs should be arranged. People have
incompatible interests, and insofar as they each pursue these narrow self-
interests this leads to conflict. Moreover, although it is often thought that
morality-and in particular the impartial idea that all people's interests are
in some sense equally important-will eliminate or at least dampen political
conflict, this is a mistake. Even people who display an impartial regard for
one another will continue to disagree about their collective affairs, and will
come into conflict with one another, insofar as they have inconsistent
beliefs about what their several interests consist in or about what balance
among these competing interests is just. 19 Secular humanists and religious
18. This is recognized by the positive law in the narrow context of criminal
prosecutions, see, e.g., Standards Relating to the Admin. of Criminal Justice §§ 3-5.7(b), 3-
3.9, 3-3.11 (a), (c), on the ground, roughly, that the prosecution function is a special case of
lawyering, made so in virtue of the special rights of criminal defendants. But if the argument
that I propose is correct, then almost every form of lawyering on behalf of the government is
a special case, and restrictions on the partisanship of government lawyers much more
broadly are in order.
19. As Thomas Nagel observes, persons may all be "motivated by an impartial regard
for one another [but] be led into conflict by that very motive if they disagree about what the
good life consists in, hence what they should want impartially for everyone." Thomas Nagel,
Equality and Partiality 154 (1991).
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fundamentalists, for example, may both care deeply about promoting the
good life for everyone on equal terms. But they will disagree about the
most basic features of the good life (including even about whether it may be
found in this world or in the next20) and about the most basic structure of
equality (including even about whether impartiality requires concern for all
or only for all the faithful 21). In this and myriad other analogous cases,
morality, and in particular the impartial concern for others that thinking
morally involves, does not promote harmony but in fact itself presents an
independent source of conflict, which is an expression of persons' moral
commitments and not a retreat from them.
These conflicts are, moreover, ineliminable. They are inevitable products
of the competition for scarce resources and the fact that the diversity of
human experience and the complexity of human reason make pluralism the
natural state of ethical life.22  Collective life (and indeed peaceful
coexistence) therefore requires people who are naturally free and
independent, and capable of objecting and resisting against collective
decisions, to accept and obey collective decisions even when they remain
unpersuaded of the decisions' merits. And politics takes as its central task
elaborating and marshalling reasons to obey.
Government naturally (indeed almost universally) addresses this problem
by aspiring not just to acquire the power to enforce collective decisions but
also to generate voluntary compliance by sustaining an agreement about
which decisions to obey, even in the face of disagreement about which
decisions to adopt. Government aspires, that is, to achieve political
legitimacy, which is to say to attain a distinctively political kind of authority
over the governed. Moreover, although some-philosophical
anarchists 23-have insisted that in spite of this natural aspiration, political
legitimacy is impossible, so that government can never rise above brute
coercion, the dominant traditions in political philosophy have resisted this
despairing counsel and proposed routes by which government might
achieve legitimacy.
These proposals fall into two camps. The first approach, exemplified in
the work of John Rawls, 24 articulates a freestanding conception of political
(as opposed to moral) equality that claims to underwrite political
legitimacy. According to this approach, political power is "proper and
hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution
the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to
20. They will also disagree, therefore, about whether collective arrangements should
serve the needs of this world or of the next.
21. This assumes that faith is available to all.
22. John Rawls has famously called this the "fact of reasonable pluralism." John Rawls,
Political Liberalism, at xvii (1993).
23. The clearest contemporary statement of this position appears in Robert Paul Wolff,
In Defense of Anarchism (2d ed. 1998).
24. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), and especially Rawls, supra note 22.
1372 [Vol, 75
ADVERSAR YAD VOCACY
endorse," 25 specifically because it is "consistent with their freedom and
equality." 26 Insofar as a government abides by this "liberal principle of
legitimacy," 27 which establishes the ground rules for political life, it may be
justified to each citizen, from that citizen's own point of view, even in the
face of intractable first-order disagreement about what political policies are
best and even when the government pursues (within these ground rules)
particular policies that some citizens find unappealing. This approach to
legitimacy places the understanding at the center of politics, proposing to
achieve legitimacy by generating an agreement on abstract propositions
about political essentials that may be sustained based on reason alone and
entirely apart from any affective engagement with the actual political
process.28
This theoretical approach to political legitimacy has been given powerful
developments, including of course by Rawls himself. But these several
theoretical elaborations of political legitimacy, indeed through their very
appeal, emphasize a structural (and therefore ineliminable) shortcoming of
theoretical approaches to legitimacy. 29 Even as each theory of legitimacy
purports (credibly) to regulate political power in ways that fairly resolve
disagreements among citizens about what first-order ends power should
serve, and therefore to justify power to every citizen from her own point of
view, the theories of legitimacy themselves remain inconsistent with one
another. Indeed, as the enduring liveliness of the field of political
philosophy directly illustrates, the inevitable disagreement among theories
of political legitimacy is not disagreement simpliciter but rather reasonable
disagreement, which, like moral disagreement, arises organically out of the
diversity of perspectives and experiences of free and equal participants in
any shared political life.30 Such reasonable disagreement undermines the
25. Rawls, supra note 22, at 217.
26. Id. at 218.
27. Id. at 217.
28. Process plays a role in Rawls's theory, to be sure. In particular, the original position
through which Rawls's theory of justice arises presents a case of what he calls pure
procedural justice: The original position provides a "correct or fair procedure" for reasoning
about political justice in the sense that principles of justice adopted in the original position
are "correct or fair, whatever [they are], provided that the procedure has been properly
followed." Rawls, supra note 24, at 86. But although the original position invokes
proceduralist ideas, it remains, as Rawls stresses, a "purely hypothetical situation," id., and
the appeal of the principles of justice that arise out of the original position depends on the
theoretical appeal of the original position as a device for representing the problem of justice
and not on any affective engagements that result from actually inhabiting it.
29. My emphasis on the need for political philosophy to take into account disagreement
not just about the first-order uses of political power that a theory of legitimacy seeks to
justify but also about legitimacy itself (disagreement, in other words, at every level of the
theory) resembles Jeremy Waldron's emphasis on the importance of taking into account
disagreement about justice. See Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 1 (1999).
30. This formulation of course tracks Rawls's account of reasonable moral pluralism.
Rawls characterizes reasonable moral pluralism as "the inevitable long-run result of the
powers of human reason at work within the background of enduring free institutions."
Rawls, supra note 22, at 4. He therefore insists that it is "not an unfortunate condition of
human life." Id. at 144. By applying the same logic to reasonable pluralism about political
2006] 1373
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theoretical approach to political legitimacy, because it reveals that the
problem of legitimacy applies, recursively, even to the several theories that
purport to resolve it.
Perhaps for this reason, governments do not restrict their exertions
towards legitimacy to the theoretical model (although almost all
governments do assert their legitimacy in theoretical terms) but instead
apply a second, practical approach to sustaining their legitimacy, which at
least complements the theoretical account of legitimacy and might even
harbor aspirations to substitute for the theoretical account. This approach is
practical because it replaces the theoretical approach's emphasis on abstract
propositions about justified political power with an effort to elaborate a set
of political institutions and practices through which the participants in
politics might come to take authorship of political outcomes, including even
outcomes that they find substantively unappealing and that their political
participation sought to oppose. 3 1 Whereas the theoretical approach seeks
substantive principles of legitimacy that may be appreciated apart from any
participation in political practice, this practical approach emphasizes the
affective consequences of actual engagement with political practice-that
is, the influence that political participation aspires to have on the political
attitudes of the participants. One might say, as a shorthand, that the
practical approach to legitimacy replaces the theoretical approach's
emphasis on the understanding with an emphasis on the will.
legitimacy, I am turning the method of pluralist political philosophy in on itself (The
relation to Waldron's work, see supra note 29, is particularly close here.)
31. This characterization of the practical approach to political legitimacy may make it
seem unfair of me to place Rawls-at least in his later work and in particular in Political
Liberalism-in the theoretical camp. The idea that citizens who disagree about which
policies are good or just may nevertheless unite around a set of institutions and practices that
command allegiance based on freestanding political considerations may seem to bear a close
resemblance to Rawls's idea of an overlapping political consensus among reasonable moral
views. See generally Rawls, supra note 22. And Rawls, in essays leading up to Political
Liberalism, does say that his conception of political legitimacy "is practical" and "presents
itself not as a conception of justice that is true, but one that can serve as a basis of informed
and willing political agreement." John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not
Metaphysical, 14 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 223, 230 (1985). But in spite of these superficial
similarities, the practical approach to legitimacy as I understand it departs dramatically from
even the later Rawls's views. First, it understands political disagreement to be both broader
and deeper than Rawls supposes, so that the overlapping consensus among reasonable moral
conceptions simply cannot be had. (This criticism is powerfully developed, although not in
connection with the practical approach to legitimacy, in Joseph Raz, Facing Diversity: The
Case for Epistemic Abstinence, 19 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3, 32 (1990).) And, second, it proposes,
against the backdrop of this broad and deep agreement, that politics must be practical in a
much more intensive sense than Rawls supposes. Even in his later work, Rawls retains his
conviction that legitimacy can be achieved by finding abstract principles upon which all
citizens can agree apart from any actual political engagements with one another. Rawls's
views remain theoretical in this sense-that they take philosophical theorizing about politics
to be fundamental to political legitimacy. The view that I am proposing is practical in the
strong sense that it rejects the centrality of philosophy. Political legitimacy depends, instead,
on actual and affective participation in political life.
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Unlike theoretical principles of legitimacy, which attempt (and promise)
principled resolutions to political disagreements that establish settled limits
on the exercise of political power, the practical approach to legitimacy
seeks to stave off rather than to resolve political disagreements. The
practical approach aspires to establish a provisional, although hopefully
renewable, holding pattern, in which disputants must actually go through
the political process in order to accept the authority of the political
outcomes that the process generates. Elaborating the practical account of
legitimacy therefore requires identifying the political practices and
institutions that sustain this holding pattern and the individual authorship of
political outcomes that it sustains in turn.
I shall argue that the legal process, including in particular through the
contributions of adversary advocates, contributes significantly to the
practical legitimation of political power. But before taking up this claim, it
will be useful to take a brief detour through democratic theory, both
because democratic politics presents a more familiar illustration of the
practical approach to legitimacy and because the example of democracy
will serve as a template for identifying the contribution to legitimacy made
by the adversary legal process.
II. THE EXAMPLE OF DEMOCRACY
Lived experience suggests that democracy is a substantial legitimating
force in political life. Indeed, the connection between democracy and
legitimacy is one of the fixed points of modern politics-it is, one might
say, a phenomenon in search of an explanation. Both main traditions of
philosophical thought about political legitimacy have sought to provide one.
A brief discussion of the drawbacks of theoretical accounts of democracy's
contribution to political legitimacy and the advantages of practical accounts
will lay the groundwork for a more intensive investigation of the
contributions to political legitimacy made by the adversary legal process. 32
Theoretical accounts explain democracy's legitimating' character by
reference to a special application of the broader ideals out of which they
construct the general principles of political legitimacy that they champion,
for example by casting democracy as the political branch of a more general
ideal of equality.33 This idea appears in Rawls's early work, as in the
32. This discussion reprises a longer argument that appears in Daniel Markovits,
Democratic Disobedience, 114 Yale L.J. 1897, 1905-21 (2005).
33. An alternative approach connects democracy directly to legitimacy's concern for
universal justification of political power, under the headings neutral or nonsectarian politics
and public reason. This approach appears in Rawls's later work, which casts universally
acceptable public reason as "characteristic of a democratic people," Rawls, supra note 22, at
213, and is developed by Bruce Ackerman, who expressly seeks to "reconcile
majoritarianism with the principles of liberal dialogue," Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice
in the Liberal State 277 (1980), that is, with the liberal demand for political legitimation on
mutually acceptable terms, specifically by demonstrating that these principles require a
decision procedure that is formally equivalent to majority rule. I do not address this
alternative separately here, except to say that it also places democratic decision making, in
2006] 1375
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
observation that "[p]erhaps the most obvious political inequality is the
violation of the precept one person one vote." 34  But it is most fully
developed by Ronald Dworkin, who elaborates an account of democracy
expressly in response to the question, "How would a community based on
equal concern [for all its members] choose its representative officials? '35
Dworkin observes that answers to this question naturally lead to a broadly
substantive conception that identifies democracy as the form of government
"most likely to produce the substantive decisions and results that treat all
members of the community with equal concern,"'36 or, put slightly
differently, to "improve the accuracy" of political decisions, by making
them more consistent with the demands of equality. 37 This account of
democracy therefore places democratic decision making, in the intuitive
sense associated with elections and majority rule, at the mercy of the
substantive equality principle from which democracy derives, so that voting
must give way to equality's demands whenever the two conflict. And
Dworkin would indeed limit majoritarian decisions to the narrow class of
what he calls choice-sensitive issues, that is, issues "whose correct solution,
as a matter of justice, depends essentially on the character and distribution
of preferences within the political community." 38 Not many issues (and
certainly not many politically vital issues) are choice sensitive, so that this
approach to democracy is far removed from the majoritarian and procedural
elements that dominate everyday democratic understandings-so far
removed that the idea that democracy arises when equality is applied to
politics turns out not to generate a practice of democracy, in the ordinary
sense, at all. Certainly this approach cannot explain the wide range of
disagreements to which the authority of democracy-the legitimacy of
democratic decision-in practice extends.
the intuitive sense associated with elections and majority rule, at the mercy of the ideals of
liberal dialogue from which it begins, so that democracy is again not a freestanding ground
of political legitimacy but rather a way of choosing among alternatives whose legitimacy has
been established by other means. For a more detailed discussion of these ideas, see
Markovits, supra note 32, at 1908-10.
34. Rawls, supra note 24, at 231. Rawls's views were of course more subtle than this
simple remark reveals. He acknowledged, for example, that the difference principle applies
in this area to justify inequalities that benefit the worst off, so that political inequality is
justified as long as it is "to the benefit of those with the lesser liberty." Id. at 232.
35. Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 184
(2000).
36. Id. at 186. Dworkin calls the formal conception of democracy "detached" and the
substantive conception that he adopts "dependent." Id. (emphasis omitted).
37. Id. at 204.
38. Id. Dworkin reveals how narrow this class is when he observes that "[t]hough it
might seem odd," he believes that it is "sensible" even "to speak of a decision ... to give aid
to the [Nicaraguan] Contras as either accurate or inaccurate," so that his liberal conception of
democracy requires that this decision be made accurately, regardless of citizens' actual
preferences or the outcomes of a majoritarian process. Id. As an example of a choice-
sensitive issue, Dworkin imagines the decision "whether to use available public funds to
build a new sports center or a new road system," although even here he suggests that choice-
insensitive issues like distributive justice may "merge in that decision." Id.
1376 [Vol. 75
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The theoretical approach to democratic legitimacy denies that democracy
in its common procedural sense can legitimately resolve deep
disagreements about morality or justice and instead converts the democratic
process into a residual category, to be employed only in the narrow range of
cases in which liberal principles of justice produce indeterminate results.
As Rawls admits, we "submit our conduct to democratic authority only to
the extent necessary to share equitably in the inevitable imperfections of a
constitutional system." 39 Democracy's broad contribution to legitimacy in
actual political life must therefore be explained by other means, and the
practical traditions of political legitimacy that I introduced earlier naturally
suggest themselves. These traditions explain democracy's contribution to
political legitimacy in terms of the affective consequences of engagement
with the democratic political process-that is, in terms of the influence that
democratic politics aspires to have on the political attitudes of the persons
who participate in it. Democracy functions, as Alexander Bickel said in
elaborating a version of the practical view, "not merely as a sharer of
power, but as a generator of consent. '40 This account of democracy is
naturally suited to explaining the breadth of democracy's legitimating
capacities in ordinary political experience. Because it accords the
democratic process a freestanding political authority that does not depend
on democracy's convergence on antecedent ideals such as equality, the
practical approach to democracy promises an expansive account of
legitimate democratic decision, which may reach even cases in which
democratic choices conflict with such ideals. 41
The practical account of democracy proposes that the democratic process,
properly constructed and managed, transforms citizens from isolated
individuals into members of a democratic sovereign, with which they
identify and whose will they take as their own even when they have been
outvoted. It proposes that a well-functioning democratic process induces
those who participate in it to take authorship of the collective choices that
the process generates. 42 This proposal underwrites a practical theory of
39. Rawls, supra note 24, at 355. Thus Rawls's theory ofjustice restricts the democratic
process by imposing substantive requirements on policy concerning not just basic liberties
but the distributions of all primary goods, including income and wealth, powers and
opportunities, and even the social bases of self-respect. See id. at 62.
40. Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 15 (1975). Bickel was commenting
approvingly on Edmund Burke, who famously championed the right of elected
representatives to vote their consciences and connected this practice to the authority of
representative government. See Edmund Burke, Speech on Fox's India Bill (Dec. 1, 1783),
in 5 The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke: India: Madras and Bengal, 1774-1785,
at 378 (Paul Langford et al. eds., 1981).
41. See, e.g., Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
95 Mich. L. Rev. 1517, 1538 (1997) (reviewing Owen Fiss, Liberalism Divided: Freedom of
Speech and the Many Uses of State Power (1996)) ("Approaches that attempt to maximize
other kinds of equality of ideas or of persons are either implausible or inconsistent with the
principle of collective self-governance [that is, democracy].").
42. I borrow use of authorship in this connection from Robert Post. See Robert C. Post,
Democracy and Equality, 1 Law Culture & Human. 142, 144 (2005); see also Robert C.
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democratic political legitimacy because the sense of individual authorship
of collective decisions that the democratic process sustains gives these
decisions the authority over individual citizens that political legitimacy
requires. The practical view of democracy proceeds, one might say, in the
spirit of Rousseau, defusing the problem of political legitimacy by
proposing that democracy presents a political mechanism through which
each person "uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains
as free as before. ''43
The great question for the practical approach to democratic legitimacy is
just how an affective engagement with the democratic process sustains this
sense of authorship even of outcomes that a person opposed. Rousseau's
own view seems to have been that in properly functioning democratic
systems, the democratic process simply subsumes citizens' political agency.
Thus, Rousseau claims that "[t]he citizen consents to all the laws, even to
those passed against his will, and even to those that punish him when he
dares to violate one of them." 44 And he adds, imagining a conflict between
his private will and the democratic (general) will, that "[i]f [the] private will
had prevailed, I would have done something other than what I wanted. It is
then that I would not have been free." 45 This is at once implausible and
sinister-it carries the deference to the collective that political legitimacy
necessarily involves over into a denial of the individual self that cannot be
had and should not be sought. But the idea behind the practical approach
should not be tarnished by Rousseau's excesses in developing it. Joint
action has intrinsic and not just instrumental appeal for people, who can be
lonely and generally dislike it, and whose natural state is therefore not
solitariness but rather engagement with others. Although political life is not
the only way in which people can engage one another,46 it is a properly
Post, Between Democracy and Community: The Legal Constitution of Social Form, in
NOMOS XXXV: Democratic Community 163, 170 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds.,
1993) (arguing that democracy makes collective self-government possible by "social
processes anterior to majoritarian decision making that somehow connect the democratic
system as a whole to the autonomous will of the entire citizenry"). In both essays, Post is
following Hans Kelsen, who observed that "[a] subject is politically free insofar as his
individual will is in harmony with the 'collective' (or 'general') will expressed in the social
order. Such harmony of the 'collective' and the individual will is guaranteed only if the
social order is created by the individuals whose behavior it regulates." Hans Kelsen, General
Theory of Law and State 285 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1945). The idea of authorship also
appears in Habermas, who observes that "legal persons can be autonomous only insofar as
they can understand themselves, in the exercise of their civic rights, as authors of just those
rights which they are supposed to obey as addressees." Jiirgen Habermas, On the Internal
Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy, 3 Eur. J. of Phil. 12, 15 (1995).
43. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract 53 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith R.
Masters trans., St. Martin's Press 1978) (1762).
44. Id. at 110.
45. Id. at 111.
46. Friendships and family relations constitute the most familiar forms of nonpolitical
communal engagement. And other forms also exist, including forms that do not require the
intimacy that friendships and families necessarily involve. I cast promise and contract as
examples of communal engagement even among strangers in Daniel Markovits, Contract
and Collaboration, 113 Yale L.J. 1417 (2004).
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prominent expression of the human instinct in favor of community. People
therefore join in politics not merely to coordinate their conduct better to
serve pre-political ends, but also (and perhaps even principally) to associate
themselves with one another through collective action (to belong to a
group), so that politics is an inner need, and not just a technological
necessity.4 7 This expresses itself most immediately through what Jeremy
Waldron has called a "felt need.., for a common framework or decision or
course of action on some matter, even in the face of disagreement about
what that framework, decision or action should be." 4 8 And democracy
appears, at least in the shadow of the Enlightenment's rejection of caste and
class, as a natural way of satisfying this need.
The democratic politics that answers the need for community, and that
generates a democratic sovereign whose decisions command the allegiance
even of dissenters, must involve more than the aggregation of antecedently
held preferences associated with simple majoritarianism. 4 9 Instead, the
democratic political process must generate engagements that break through,
that penetrate into, the preferences to be aggregated. Most familiarly,
democratic deliberation and the institutions that support it-in particular
venues for public debate such as a free press 5 0-- encourage political
engagements among citizens once political debate has been joined and
underwrite forms of respect and loyalty that support the political legitimacy
of outcomes even vis-A-vis those who have lost the debate.5 1 And, more
subtly but no less importantly, the formal structure of elections integrates
ordinary citizens into the apparatus of government in legitimacy-sustaining
ways. "Voter," after all, is a public office, and a citizen can be a voter, as
opposed to a revolutionary who participates in an election because it suits
her, only if she acknowledges the legitimacy of the election's outcome, so
that democracies that encourage their citizens to conceive of themselves as
voters therefore already sow the seeds of their own practical legitimacy.
Moreover, the mass political parties that accompany democracy similarly
implicate their members in the legitimacy of the political processes they
seek to influence. Political parties naturally evolve to pursue not raw power
47. I owe this way of putting the point to Bernard Williams.
48. Waldron, supra note 29, at 102.
49. Mere aggregation, even when it is fair, cannot sustain the authorship of its results on
which democratic political legitimacy depends. Certainly the most familiar forms of
aggregation-lotteries, for example, or markets-do not do so. And voting separated from
the thicker forms of democratic engagement-public deliberation, political parties, a free
press-would fare no better.
50. Democracies also encourage deliberation through political mechanisms-for
example, the separation of powers in the United States and proportional representation on the
European Continent-that force coalition-building at various stages in the political process
and therefore demand the forms of political debate and engagement that are necessary for
sustaining coalitions. For a slightly more detailed, although still brief, account of these
matters, see Markovits, supra note 32, at 1918-21.
5 1. This is the theme that unifies the several approaches to deliberative democracy. See,
e.g., Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (1984); 1-2
JUrgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984).
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(that is, the direct capacity to implement policy) but rather the intermediate
end of political office, narrowly understood. And political offices, being
creatures of the wider political system in which they appear, can be
obtained only against the backdrop of the legitimacy of the procedures that
this system employs for allocating them. (Revolutionaries may implement
policy when they overthrow a government, but they cannot become
senators.) 52 This once again encourages party members to recast their
political ambitions in forms that implicitly accept the authority of the wider
political system, including even the authority of competing parties when
they win elections. These features of democratic elections penetrate
individual citizens' political preferences in legitimacy-reinforcing ways
even before what is ordinarily thought of as politics-that is, competition
over whose preferences will dictate policy-has begun. They contribute to
shaping the preferences of democratic citizens in ways that encourage the
citizens to take authorship of democratic outcomes and acknowledge their
legitimacy.
Much more would have to be said, of course, to convert these rough
reflections into a mature account of the practical legitimacy of democratic
politics. The ways in which democratic institutions and political
engagement penetrate citizens' preferences would have to be explained in
greater detail. And it would be necessary to demonstrate that the feelings of
authorship that democratic politics produces are justified (or at least that
they can withstand rational reflection) and not mere ideology. (Here there
is room for reintroducing some of the concerns that generated the
theoretical treatment of legitimacy, although not in the expansive form that
the theoretical treatment gives them.) But although these are important
topics, they can be set aside for now. What has been said so far is enough
to establish a template for the account of the adversary system's
contributions to political legitimacy that follows.
III. AN ANALOGY TO ADJUDICATION
The example of democracy illustrates, in familiar circumstances, both the
shortcomings of theoretical approaches to political legitimacy and the
appeal of an alternative practical approach. Moreover, the account of
democratic legitimacy may be reprised in the less familiar case of the legal
process. The legal process presents a problem of political legitimacy that
52. Thus, although it might be thought that political parties are important primarily
because they connect parliamentarians to the masses (serving to keep ruling elites informed
of the wishes of the people), political parties' greater contribution to politics may actually be
to connect the masses to the parliament, in the sense of channeling political ambitions into
forms that implicitly recognize government authority. This is probably especially true in
democracies, because although parties can exist under many political regimes, they are most
broadly appealing in democracies. The best historical account of the role of political parties
in sustaining democratic legitimacy appears in Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party
System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840 (1969). An
underappreciated early account is Martin Van Buren, Inquiry into the Origin and Course of
Political Parties in the United States (Smith T. Van Buren et al. eds., 1867).
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runs parallel to the problem of the legitimacy of the political process,
although at a different point in a society's overall structure of government.
And the adversary system sustains the legitimacy of the legal process in
much the same way as democracy sustains the legitimacy of the political
process. The analogy to democracy therefore promises to generate a
reconstruction of the adversary system defense that can underwrite a rich
and appealing political account of the distinctively lawyerly virtues. This
argument must proceed slowly, however, first elaborating a general
approach to the legitimacy of the legal process and only then turning to the
role that this general approach to legitimacy establishes for adversary
advocacy in particular.
Citizens may naturally object to their government's authority at two
places: first, when the government, most characteristically through
legislation, adopts general rules concerning how it will exercise its power;
and, second, when the government, through executive enforcement or
adjudication, applies these general rules to particular facts in particular
cases. Moreover, although collective decisions must be legitimated at each
of these places, the democratic process engages only the first of them, so
that although democracy is a powerful legitimating force in politics, it does
not exhaust the opportunities for legitimation or complete the legitimation
of political power by itself. Nor does democracy in fact stand alone in the
theories of political legitimacy in which it figures so prominently. Instead,
political philosophy typically pairs the arguments about democratic
legitimacy through which it explains the general authority of governments
with arguments about the legitimacy of adjudication (typically proceeding
under the heading "the rule of law") that support the authority of a
government in connection with specific applications of its powers to
particular cases. It is, as Karl Llewellyn said, one of the "law-jobs" to
sustain authoritative resolutions of "trouble cases"-cases in which general
principles do not straightforwardly resolve themselves into consensus
outcomes. 53 And the process of adjudication establishes the context in
which lawyers go to work.
One might say, then, that what democracy is to political legitimacy at
wholesale, adjudication is to political legitimacy at retail. 54  And a
53. See K.N. Llewellyn & E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case
Law in Primitive Jurisprudence (1941).
54. This idea, that even laws that have been adopted by legitimate political processes
face a separate and independent challenge to their legitimacy when they are actually applied,
is essential to the argument to come. It is also far from universally accepted. W. Bradley
Wendel, for example, has recently argued that "lawyer[s] must respect the achievement
represented by law: the final settlement of contested issues (both factual and normative)
with a view toward enabling coordinated action in our highly complex, pluralistic society,"
and that this requires them to constrain their partisanship according to (their views of) the
law's underlying purposes. W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1167, 1168-69 (2005); see also Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can't Just Be
Hired Guns, in Ethics in Practice: Lawyers' Roles, Responsibilities, and Regulation 42, 47
(Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000) (arguing that the ethics of advocacy must be approached
against the backdrop of a rebuttable "presumption that the law very imperfectly sets forth an
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characteristically adversary approach to adjudication is therefore justified
insofar as lawyers' adversariness contributes to the retail legitimation of
political power that the legal process is called on to provide. This
connection to political legitimacy makes it natural for justifications of
adversary advocacy to proceed in parallel to justifications of democracy.
And indeed they do.
On the one hand, the traditional elaboration of the adversary system
defense closely resembles the familiar theoretical claim that the democratic
process is justified because it best serves antecedent ideals of equality and
neutrality. In particular, it proposes that the balance between partisan
lawyers established by the adversary system legitimates the retail
application of political power because it best serves antecedent ideals of
truth and justice-indeed, that the adversary process is the most accurate
engine of truth and justice that legal science can design and implement.
Moreover, the familiar shortcomings of this development of the adversary
system defense, which are directly connected to its theoretical structure, are
analogs of the familiar shortcomings of the theoretical account of
democracy. Thus, it is natural to wonder how much adversariness in
lawyers really best serves truth and justice overall-for example, whether a
broad duty to preserve client confidences really does more to vindicate than
to disguise the facts. Such worries inexorably press towards abandoning
the adversary system as we know it in favor of a system in which, as
William Simon proposes, lawyers abandon the deference to clients that
adversary partisanship involves and instead, "take those actions that,
considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to
promote justice," 55 meaning a resolution on the "legal merits," to be
established by reference to the broader purposes and principles of the
substantive law. 56 Certainly the theoretical approach to adversary advocacy
cannot justify a lawyer's using her adversary expertise successfully to
manipulate the law against its clear purpose.
Just as the theoretical suggestion that democratic legitimacy turns on
democracy's promotion of equality naturally leads to constraining the
ordinary processes of democracy (such as voting) to secure substantively
equal outcomes, so also the theoretical suggestion that the legitimacy of
approximately agreed-upon minimal framework of common purposes, a social contract").
Note that Wendel draws a distinction, in this respect, between legal and extralegal values,
and argues in particular that lawyers may not "use ... moral reasons that are not embodied
in governing legal texts to block [a] client's attempt to exercise a legal right." W. Bradley
Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 363, 385 (2004). Whereas lawyers who
impose the law's purposes on their clients support the political resolutions that the
democratic process has achieved, lawyers who impose moral (or other) values that have not
been incorporated in the law undermine this resolution. This approach, it seems to me,
ignores the difference between cases in which a law is comfortably (even unthinkingly)
obeyed and in which it meets with greater resistance. In the second type of case, the
authority of law rests as much in its application as in its adoption. And legitimacy in
application requires client-centered rather than justice-centered advocates.
55. Simon, supra note 13, at 138 (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Id.
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adversary advocacy turns on its service to truth and justice leads naturally
to constraining the ordinary adversary process (including lawyers'
partisanship) to secure true and just outcomes. Indeed, just as the
theoretical approach to democracy reaches its apogee in Dworkin's view
that the ordinary democratic process should be confined to deciding
questions in which majority rule is constitutive of equality, so too the
theoretical approach to adversary advocacy reaches its highest expression in
the view that lawyers should "think like judges in determining what the
relevant law is," 57 and may avoid behaving like judges only in cases in
which there exist real judges who are capable of effectively imposing this
judicial sensibility.58 The analogy between the theoretical approaches to
democracy and adversary advocacy is therefore complete: In each case, the
theoretical approach exerts an almost irresistible pressure towards
restricting the procedural elements, such as voting and partisan advocacy,
that lie at the cores of these practices as they are commonly understood; and
in each case, the goal of legitimating the folk practices in question escapes
the theoretical approach.
On the other hand, a practical reconstruction of the adversary system
defense, which closely parallels the practical reconstruction of democracy,
naturally presents itself. The theoretical approach fails to take advantage of
the legitimating powers of affective engagement with the legal process (just
as the theoretical account of democracy fails to exploit the legitimating
powers of affective engagement with the democratic process). In particular,
the theoretical version of the adversary system defense approaches the legal
process as a technology for satisfying process-independent claims (just as
the theoretical approach to democracy treats the democratic process as a
technology for producing process-independent equality). The theoretical
approach treats process, to borrow a word from legal sociology, as
transparent, in the sense that it has "no effect on the values, goals, and
desires of those who use the system," 59 so that one can look backwards
through a legal proceeding, from its end to its beginning, and see the same
claims asserted throughout, in undistorted form.
But this is, as the sociologists point out, a mistaken account of legal
process, associated with the formalism of classical jurisprudence, and now
discredited. (This is an independent ground for rejecting the traditional
adversary system defense.) Instead, "the relationship between objectives
[in a dispute] and mechanisms [of dispute resolution] is reciprocal: not
only do objectives influence the choice of mechanisms, but mechanisms
57. Robert W. Gordon, The Radical Conservatism of The Practice of Justice, 51 Stan. L.
Rev. 919, 922 (1999) (reviewing Simon, supra note 13).
58. Id.
59. David M. Trubek, The Handmaiden's Revenge: On Reading and Using the Newer
Sociology of Civil Procedure, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1988, at 111, 115.
"Transparent procedure," as Trubek says, "takes the litigants as they come to the court." Id.
It "does not add or subtract anything" to their dispute, so that it "should not make a
difference in the [right] outcome of a dispute." Id. at 114.
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chosen may alter objectives."60 This fact about the legal process opens up
the way to a practical reconstruction of the adversary system defense, which
(again analogizing to the practical account of democracy) places the
affective consequences of engagement with the legal process-the
transformations wrought by the process-at the center of its legitimacy.
IV. THE TRANSFORMATIVE LEGAL PROCESS
Like democracy, the legal process legitimates the application of political
power through the affective engagements it requires of the parties to legal
disputes, in particular by penetrating the ideals and preferences of these
parties. In this way, the legal process legitimates disputes not by reaching
settlements that the participants would have accepted before going through
the process, but by transforming the participants (through engaging them)
so that they come to take authorship of the resolutions that the process
produces.
As the sociology of law observes, the legal process and the activities of
the lawyers who administer it penetrate the attitudes of the disputants at
several depths and therefore transform their attitudes in several different
ways. Most shallowly, the legal process "translates [disputants' private
complaints], and reconstitutes the issues in terms of a legal discourse which
has trans-situational applicability."' 61  Lawyers "objectify" their client's
arguments and "set them apart from the particular interests they
represent,"'62 so that the client's positions come to be seen as participating
in broader principles "in terms of which ... binding solution[s] [to
disputes] can be found. '63 The lawyers who administer the legal process
serve as "culture broker[s]" for their clients,64 organizing and transforming
their clients' claims in terms of this discourse to render them more
persuasive. 65 At an intermediate depth, lawyers and the legal process
"test[] the reality of the[ir] clien[ts'] perspective[s]," 66  piercing
unreasonable hopes and inaccurate perceptions 67 and, by contrast,
legitimating the other elements of their clients' positions that are not
60. See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 631,
642 (1980-81).
61. Lynn Mather & Barbara Yngvesson, Language, Audience, and the Transformation
of Disputes, 15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 775, 791 (1980-81).
62. Ronen Shamir, Managing Legal Uncertainty: Elite Lawyers in the New Deal 38
(1995).
63. Maureen Cain, The General Practice Lawyer and the Client: Towards a Radical
Conception, 7 Int'l J. of the Soc. of L. 331, 343 (1979) (emphasis omitted).
64. Mather & Yngvesson, supra note 61, at 792.
65. Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 Law & Soc'y Rev.
115, 125 (1979).
66. Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, supra note 60, at 646.
67. See Jeffrey Fitzgerald & Richard Dickins, Disputing in Legal and Nonlegal
Contexts: Some Questions for Sociologists of Law, 15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 681, 698 (1980-
81).
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pierced.68 And at the deepest level, an engagement with the legal process
does not just translate or test disputants' claims but fundamentally
reconstitutes them, specifically by transforming brute demands into
assertions of right, which depend on reasons and therefore by their nature
implicitly recognize the conditions of their own failure (namely that the
reasons do not support the claims in the case at hand).69 Indeed, the legal
process can sometimes even induce disputants to recognize a still deeper
contingency in their demands, as they come to see a "problem as an
adjustment between competing claims and interests, rather than as one
warranting a fight for principle. '70
These transformations, taken collectively, can have real staying power.
When it is successful, the legal process, to borrow Lon Fuller's form of
words, has the "capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, not by
imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared
perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes
and dispositions toward one another. '71 Indeed, the transformative effect
on a dispute of the legal process is potentially so powerful that "the
transformed dispute can actually become the dispute," 72 so that the parties
abandon any of their demands that cannot be accommodated within the
transformation.
When this happens, the legitimacy of the legal process naturally follows,
because the reconstructed disputes and the resolutions that the legal process
proposes have been tailored to suit each other, so that parties who come
(through their affective engagements with the legal process) to see their
disputes as the legal process proposes also come to accept the resolutions
that the legal process recommends. Indeed, someone who engages the legal
process to resolve a dispute but denies its legitimacy when her claims fail
on their legal merits commits bad faith against the legal process-she in
fact retains unreconstructed and perhaps even unreasonable brute demands
even as she purports to be asserting reconstructed, reasonable claims of
68. This effect emphasizes "the impact on the client of the lawyer's attitude, his
expression or implied approval of this as so legitimate that a lawyer is willing to help him
get it, whereas other elements of the client's goals are disapproved and help in getting them
is refused," Talcott Parsons, The Law and Social Control, in Law and Sociology:
Exploratory Essays 56, 70 (William M. Evan ed., 1962).
69. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 368
(1978). Fuller imagines a baseball player who transforms his brute claim to play catcher into
a claim of right based on his being the best catcher available and therefore implicitly
acknowledges that he must abandon his claim in case a more skilled catcher appears. See id.
70. Macaulay, supra note 65, at 128.
71. Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 305, 325
(1971). Fuller wrote these words as part of a discussion of mediation, which he sought in
certain respects to contrast with adjudication, see id. at 328, so that my appropriation of
Fuller's characterization stands in some tension with his official position on adjudication. I
quote Fuller, nevertheless, because I believe that my account remains generally in sympathy
with Fuller's broader emphasis on the legitimating character of adjudication. See, e.g.,
Fuller, supra note 69.
72. Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, supra note 60, at 650.
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right. And she therefore escalates the dispute from a simple disagreement
into a case of deception and manipulation-one might even say fraud-
which is something that most disputants will naturally resist as inconsistent
with their basic commitments to respect persons.
V. LEGITIMATION AS A POLITICAL IDEAL
This account follows in a long tradition that emphasizes the legal
process's contribution to political cohesion and treats the lawyers who
administer the process as peacemakers. It is as old, at least, as
Tocqueville's impressed assessment of the lawyerliness of Americans, who,
even in "their daily controversies," tend to "borrow ... the ideas, and even
the language, peculiar to judicial proceedings." 73 Indeed, even the legal
profession's harshest critics acknowledge that lawyers serve as experts who
mediate between citizens and the state, 74 so that the legal process
complements democracy's efforts in support of political stability.
It is important to emphasize the political character of the legitimation that
adversary adjudication sustains. To accept the legitimacy of the legal
process is not to applaud or even to welcome its outcomes. In particular,
accepting the legitimacy of adjudication does not require believing that the
legal process has reached the just or accurate outcome. That would be too
much to ask. Just as the democratic process cannot possibly eliminate
political disagreement at wholesale, so adjudication cannot possibly
eliminate disagreement at retail: In each case, losers will often continue to
believe (reasonably) that they are in the right. Instead, adjudication, like
democracy, aims only to persuade disputants that they are obligated to
comply with its outcomes even when they remain unpersuaded on the
merits. It aims, that is, to exclude disputants' independent judgments of the
merits from their grounds for resisting, and in this sense to achieve
authority. And indeed, although dissatisfaction with adjudication,
especially among those who have just gone through it, is one of the
banalities of contemporary legal culture, -the acceptance of adjudication's
legitimate authority in spite of this dissatisfaction is equally entrenched in
the culture. Disputants commonly satisfy verdicts without the need for
separate enforcement proceedings. And even when voluntary compliance
with adjudication breaks down-as, for example, in connection with the
collection of child support from absentee fathers 75-the success of
resistance against judgments only emphasizes the extent to which
73. 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 357 (Francis Bowen ed., Henry
Reeve trans., 6th ed., Boston, John Allyn 1876) (1835).
74. See Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers 34-35 (1989).
75. See, e.g., Drew A. Swank, The National Child Non-Support Epidemic, 2003 Mich.
St. DCL L. Rev. 357, 358-59. But note that even here there is some reason to believe that a
significant portion of delinquency is caused by inability rather than unwillingness to make
payments. See Ronald K. Henry, Child Support at a Crossroads: When the Real World
Intrudes Upon Academics and Advocates, 33 Fain. L.Q. 235, 237 (1999).
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compliance with the legal process more generally exceeds whatever
compulsion legal institutions could plausibly assert.
But these observations do not yet justify the lawyer's conduct or the
transformative effects of the legal process, because stability is not the only
political value and even peace is not worth every price. And the dominant
view among those who emphasize the transformative character of the legal
process is critical of lawyers' contributions to dispute resolution.
According to this view, the transformations that the legal process induces in
disputants' attitudes, and therefore resolutions to disputes that depend on
these transformations, cannot be justified in a principled way. The legal
process, on this view, is merely a tool of ideology-a way of manipulating
certain litigants to get them to accept being cheated. This happens most
dramatically when lawyers persuade their clients simply to abandon claims
or defenses that are justified, as when public defenders "cool[] out" criminal
defendants and get them to accept punishments that they do not deserve, 76
or when lawyers "manipulate[] and fool[]" 77 consumer-clients about their
rights under consumer protection laws and in this way "lead the client[s] to
redefine the situation so that [they] can accept it."' 78  It also happens,
although more subtly, when the transformations wrought by the legal
process deprive even surviving claims of their principled content, for
example when engagement with the legal process that administers worker's
compensation in the face of industrial accidents "convince[s] workers to
rely on employer paternalism to ensure their safety and relinquish claims to
control the workplace. ' 79 In these ways, and in myriad others, lawyers and
the legal process support transformations in disputes that "create ends so
that clients come to want--or at least accept-what the system is prepared
to deliver." 80 And the "social construction of the self through ideology and
language 81 that is imposed by the transformative legal process involves
"depoliticization, apathy, anomie" 82 and so "suppresses the full potential of
the self."' 83 The legal process, to put it bluntly, secures peace only by
abandoning justice.
There is much in this view, to be sure, and the peaceful resolutions to
disputes that the transformative legal process sustains certainly can come at
the expense of some measure of justice. But criticisms of the legal process
that focus exclusively on shortfalls in justice take aim at a conception of the
legal process that is mistaken in two related ways. First, these criticisms
treat procedure as transparent rather than transformative (a strange irony in
76. Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession, Law & Soc'y Rev., June 1967, at 15, 28.
77. Macaulay, supra note 65, at 159.
78. Id. at 124.
79. Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, supra note 60, at 644 (citing James Weinstein, Big Business
and the Origin of Worlonan 's Compensation, 8 Labor History 1560 (1967)).
80. Trubek, supra note 59, at 122.
81. Id. at 125.
82. Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, supra note 60, at 650.
83. Trubek, supra note 59, at 125.
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criticisms that belong to a tradition whose descriptive components
emphasize that the legal process inevitably transforms disputes). Insofar as
procedure is transformative, the outcomes that disputants are prepared to
accept after having engaged the legal process will necessarily differ from
the outcomes that they set out to pursue through this process or that they
regarded as antecedently just, and disputants who have come through the
legal process will prefer these outcomes to alternatives that they initially
rated more highly. It is therefore unreasonable to evaluate post-process
outcomes based exclusively on pre-process attitudes and standards. Unless
one is prepared to cast the legal process's transformative powers as
absolutely and irredeemably oppressive, one must approve some portion of
the inevitable departures from antecedent notions of justice that the process
generates. This is just the retail expression of a phenomenon that the
experience of democracy makes familiar at wholesale, namely that citizens
properly prefer to be governed by less just laws that enjoy a democratic
pedigree over being governed by more just laws that do not.
Second, and relatedly, exclusively justice-based evaluations of the legal
process attribute to that process the ambitions associated with the
theoretical rather than the practical approach to politics. The appropriate
way to approach the legal process, from a practical perspective, is to ask not
whether it is just but rather whether it is legitimate-not whether its
outcomes satisfy antecedent principles but rather whether the
transformations occasioned by engagement with the legal process can
sustain the disputants' sense of authorship of the outcomes that these
engagements have produced. 84 As at the wholesale level, so also (if less
familiarly) at retail, legitimacy is the most that can be hoped for in the
shadow of the deep and intractable theoretical disagreements that disputes
involve-including disagreements not just about the facts or the legal and
moral values that are at play but also about how justly to resolve
disagreements concerning these facts and values. Transparent procedures
that answer to theoretical ideals of justice simply cannot sustain orderly
dispute resolution in these circumstances, because they themselves
inevitably become subjects of disputes. Only transformative procedures,
which answer to practical conceptions of legitimacy, can hope to sustain a
stable political life, and both democracy (at wholesale) and the legal process
(at retail) must be approached keeping these basic features of politics in
mind. It is therefore a piece of good fortune-and not a thing to be
lamented-that our practical nature leaves us susceptible to the
transformative effects of procedure, for if we were not so susceptible,
collective life would not be possible for us. 85
84. Injustice that becomes too pronounced may of course threaten this sense of
authorship and undermine legitimacy, but justice is not (nor indeed could it be) a necessary
condition for legitimacy.
85. This idea is more emphasized in political literature than in political philosophy. A
particularly forceful literary example is Robert Bolt's treatment of Thomas More, whose
central theme is to celebrate the political possibilities brought on by human impurity. See
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In short, "the lawyer's job," as Robert Gordon says, "is selling
legitimacy," 86 not at wholesale but at retail, one client at a time. To do so,
he must 'mediate between the universal vision of legal order and the
concrete desires of his clients." 87 Of course, this practical account of retail
political legitimation and the legal process depends on the effectiveness of
the legal process at penetrating disputants' attitudes and sustaining the
transformations in disputants' attitudes and the sense of authorship of
outcomes to which it aspires. Moreover, even if the argument succeeds in
demonstrating that justice is an inappropriate standard for judging the legal
process (as it is an inappropriate standard for judging the democratic
process), the practical approach to the legal process cannot rest on the bare
fact that disputants accept authorship of the resolutions that the legal
process proposes. A merely subjective experience of authorship of an
outcome may be manufactured in ways that undermine its capacity to
legitimate, even on the practical view. Thus, the sense of authorship may
be secured by deception, for example about the relative benefits and
burdens that a particular way of resolving a dispute imposes on the
disputants, or by coercion, as when the accused at show trials come to
believe their confessions. More broadly, such authorship may belong to
larger patterns of ideological manipulation designed to cause disputants to
accept burdens that they would be better off without, for example, when
victims of sexual violence internalize norms of chastity that cause them to
blame themselves. In all these cases, the experience of authorship that the
legal process engenders is a kind of alien attitude, which overwhelms rather
than expresses disputants' native practical personalities, and it therefore
cannot sustain the practical political legitimacy to which the legal process
aspires.
In order for the legal process to legitimate the retail application of
political power, the authorship of outcomes that follows engagements with
the process must be more durable and more secure than in the examples just
discussed: It must be assumed freely rather than through fraud or force, and
it must be authentic rather than ideological. These requirements are, to be
Robert Bolt, A Man For All Seasons (1962). Bolt's More insists, for example, that even
imperfect laws must be respected, because to do otherwise invites catastrophic conflict.
"This country's planted thick with laws," More says, "man's law, not God's-and if you cut
them down... d'you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow
then?" Id. at 66. And he emphasizes how unsuited man is to standing on principle,
observing that "God made the angels to show him splendor .... But Man he made to serve
him wittily, in the tangle of his mind. .. [so that] [o]ur natural business lies in escaping." Id.
at 126. The historical More, incidentally, probably took quite the opposite line on these
matters, and seems to have gone to his death convinced that martyrdom would bring him
closer to God.
86. Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law ": Fantasies and Practices
of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in The New High Priests: Lawyers in Post-Civil War
America 51, 53 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984).
87. Id.
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sure, weaker than the requirement, associated with the theoretical approach
to the legitimacy of the legal process, that adjudication must secure
substantive justice. But they nevertheless have real bite. Thus, the practical
legitimacy of the legal process requires that the sense of authorship of
outcomes that the process produces survives even when disputants learn
whose interests it serves, for example, or how (that is, by what methods) the
legal process established this sense of authorship in them (and how the
transformations that followed their engagements with the legal process fit
into their broader ethical and political attitudes). In short, the practical
political legitimacy of the legal process requires that the experience of
authorship that the legal process engenders remains stable in the face of the
rational reflection of those who experience it, when they apply the critical
faculties that they have or can develop.
These considerations naturally return the argument to adversary advocacy
and generate a practical reconstruction of the adversary system defense. In
place of the (failed) theoretical attempt to justify the adversary system on
the ground that it promotes substantively accurate and just legal outcomes,
this practical approach proposes to defend the adversary system by placing
adversary advocacy at the center of the legal process's retail legitimation of
political power. According to this argument, adversary advocacy is
essential to the legal process's capacity to transform disputants' attitudes so
that they take authorship of its outcomes, and, moreover, to ensuring that
this sense of authorship remains stable in the face of rational reflection
among those who experience it. Adversary advocacy is thus essential to the
political legitimacy of the legal process.
It is not surprising that the practical approach to legitimating the legal
process should emphasize the lawyer-client relation. This relation, as
Talcott Parsons observes, "is focused" on the "smoothing over" of
"situations of actual or potential social conflict. ' 88  Indeed, the
transformative engagements with the legal process that generate the
experience of authorship of outcomes on which practical legitimacy
depends are administered directly through the lawyer-client relation.
Moreover, it is not surprising that the adversariness of lawyers should
figure particularly prominently in this context, as a support for the
transformative influence of the legal process. The lawyer, Gordon
observes, "cannot deliver unless she can make plausible arguments
rationalizing her client's conduct within the prevailing terms of legal
discourse," 89 and she can do this only insofar as she takes her client's part
and endeavors "to understand the day-to-day world of the client's
transactions and deals as somehow approximating, in however decayed or
imperfect a form, the ideal or fantasy world of the legal order." 90
Adversary advocacy-including the basic ideals of lawyer loyalty and
88. Parsons, supra note 68, at 63.
89. Gordon, supra note 86, at 53-54.
90. Id. at 54.
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client control-is therefore a necessary condition for the transformative
power of the legal process, without which the legal process could not
reliably penetrate disputants' attitudes and certainly could not underwrite
transformations that remain stable in the face of disputants' rational
reflection. 9 1
The adversariness of lawyers is necessary for sustaining all the
transformations that the legal process engenders-from the shallowest to
the deepest. Even the most superficial transformations, associated with the
mere translation of claims from ordinary into legal language, will be stable
only if clients place a high degree of trust in lawyer-translators.
Specifically, clients must trust first in lawyers' capacity to understand their
claims and, second, in lawyers' commitments tofidelity in translation (even
when fidelity requires lawyers to ignore their own assessments of the
clients' claims). Only loyally partisan lawyers can earn and sustain such
trust, because only loyal partisans have the empathy necessary for
understanding their clients and the open-mindedness necessary to avoid
judging them. If lawyers retreat from adversary ideals of lawyer loyalty
and client control, their efforts at translation will no longer be trusted by
clients but will instead be experienced as foreign and hostile, so that they
disrupt rather than enhance the clients' engagements with the legal process.
Insofar as lawyers reject adversary advocacy in favor of a more positively
capable conception of their professional roles, lawyers' professional
behavior "grows introverted, preoccupied with its own norms and
activities," 92 so that the "institution [of the legal profession] develops a
carapace, impermeable to external information, prescription, or
influence." 93  And when this happens, lawyers' efforts at translation
inevitably fail, and "[t]he problems [the legal profession] handles are the
problems defined by the institution, not the society; the solutions it
91. It is worthwhile expressly to distinguish my approach from another, very different
claim about the contributions that lawyers make to resolving disputes, which gives lawyers a
role in dampening disputes while holding on to a transparent view of procedure. According
to this claim, lawyers (unlike most clients) are repeat participants in the legal process and
(unlike clients) can therefore establish reputations for cooperative dispute resolution that can
help clients to avoid the prisoner's dilemma aspect of much litigation and can therefore
improve the efficiency of outcomes. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing
Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum. L.
Rev. 509 (1994). Although I do not deny that cooperative lawyers can have this effect, the
efficiency gains associated with cooperative lawyering will come at some cost to the
legitimacy of the legal process, at least on the practical account of legitimacy that I am
proposing. Lawyers can exploit reputations for cooperation only if they can resist when
clients (who are not repeat players and have no reputations to protect) issue instructions to
defect. As Gilson and Mnookin observe, "client-centered advocacy presents a serious
problem for the lawyer seeking to establish or maintain a reputation for cooperation." Id. at
55 1. And insofar as such resistance undermines adversary lawyering, it may also undermine
lawyers' capacity to connect clients to the transformative legal process in ways that can
sustain that process's practical legitimacy.
92. Richard L. Abel, A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society, 8 Law &
Soc'y Rev. 217, 265 (1973).
93. Id.
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generates are solutions for the institution, not the society." 94 Rather than
serving as intermediaries whose interpretive efforts connect clients to the
legal process, non-adversary lawyers confront clients as an unmediated part
of the process; and rather than bringing clients into the legal process in
ways that support its practical legitimacy, non-adversary lawyers alienate
clients in ways that undermine the legal process's legitimacy.
Moreover, lawyers' ability to dampen disputes by encouraging clients to
abandon or modify their most unreasonable positions-the intermediate of
the three transformations in client attitudes that sustain the practical
legitimacy of the legal process-also depends on their commitment to
adversary advocacy. This is, to begin with, a matter of psychology and
even of emotion. Disputants' most unreasonable positions often reflect
frustration and anger rather than considered judgments, so that they are
open to being talked down and may even seek it out. But only a
sympathetic and nonjudgmental counsel will inspire the trust needed to cool
passions in this way. As Parsons says,
In order to be capable, psychologically, of 'getting things off his chest' a
person must be assured that, within certain limits . . sanctions will not
operate.... The confidential character of the lawyers' relation to his
client [and, Parsons might have added, the lawyer's loyalty and deference
more generally] provides such a situation. The client can talk freely, to an
understanding and knowledgeable ear, without fear of immediate
repercussions. 95
In addition, the adversary lawyer's unique capacity to deflate her clients'
most extreme claims has an ethical component. Both ethical theory96 and
empirical research 97 suggest that disputants have a natural ethical
inclination in favor of resolving disputes through reasonable reciprocal
concessions. But most clients, being inexperienced in the disputes in which
they are engaged, will be uncertain which concessions are in fact
reasonable. Lawyers have experience and expertise that clients do not and
can therefore help to resolve this uncertainty. But lawyers will be trusted to
do so only when clients are confident that their deflationary advice serves
the clients' interests alone, rather than the interests of the legal system or
the other disputants--only, that is, when lawyers accept the adversary
obligations associated with lawyer loyalty and client control. In these ways,
adversary advocates support both the psychological and ethical mechanisms
through which engagements with the legal process persuade disputants
94. Id. (citations omitted).
95. Parsons, supra note 68, at 67. These ideas are also emphasized in the client-
counseling literature. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, 1 Trial Manual 5 for the Defense of
Criminal Cases §§ 79-80 (1988); David A. Binder et al., Lawyers as Counselors: A Client-
Centered Approach (2d ed. 1991).
96. The capacity to understand and abide by fair terms of social cooperation is, as Rawls
says, one of the basic powers of human moral personality. See, e.g., Rawls, supra note 22, at
19.
97. See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action,
and Law, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 71 (2003).
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voluntarily to abandon their most aggressive and unreasonable demands.
And adversary advocates therefore transform disputants' attitudes in
legitimacy-enhancing ways, whereas lawyers who abandon their adversary
obligations and judge their clients rather than serving them have an
opposite, de-legitimating effect.98
Finally, lawyers' adversary commitments are especially important for
transforming clients' claims from brute demands into assertions of right
whose implicitly defeasible character makes the deepest contribution to the
legitimacy of the legal process. Once again, "a high degree of trust and
confidence are usually necessary [if lawyers are] to 'sell' [the] new
definition of the situation" that the conversion of brute demands into claims
of right involves, 99 and lawyers' adversary commitments justify their
clients' trust. Furthermore, the internal logic of the legal process (and not
just the willingness of clients to go along) also emphasizes the importance
for legitimacy of using adversary advocates to convert disputants' brute
demands into assertions of right. The legal process insists that disputants
frame their demands as assertions of right because of the commitment to
reasoned dispute resolution on which it bases its legitimacy, a commitment
that requires the legal process to address every assertion of right that can be
made in support of a disputant's position. Accordingly, the lawyers who
help disputants to transform their brute demands into assertions of right
must leave no available right unasserted. (Unasserted rights cannot be
addressed in adjudication and therefore threaten to undermine legitimacy by
coming between disputants and the resolutions to disputes that the legal
process proposes.) And lawyers can do this only if they function as
adversary advocates, amplifying and refining all their clients' claims rather
than evaluating and choosing among them. Lawyers who abandon their
adversary role in favor of personal assessments of their clients' claims quite
literally prejudge these claims. And when this happens, the legitimacy of
the legal process becomes dependent on the legitimacy of the lawyers'
judgments. But these judgments, being creatures of the lawyers' individual
minds, are virtually impossible to legitimate, and certainly cannot be
legitimated by reference to the transformative powers of a legal process that
has not yet begun. Lawyers who abandon their adversary role to pursue the
law's underlying purposes merely shift the burden of legitimation forward
to their own assessments of these purposes, which necessarily address their
clients' demands in an untransformed, and hence intractable, state.
The legal process legitimates its decisions by engaging disputants and
penetrating their attitudes, in the ways described, to encourage them to
recast their demands into forms that make disputes more tractable. A
98. This is perhaps most evident in the criminal context, where "in the eyes of many
defendants, their attorney is the most despicable member of the cast of characters who have
conspired to deprive them of their liberty; of all the figures in the courtroom, only defense
counsel pretends to be on their side." Jay Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice, and the American
Way: The Case Against the Client Perjury Rules, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 339, 364 (1994).
99. Fitzgerald & Dickins, supra note 67, at 698.
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disputant who accepts the legal process's invitation to proceed in these
terms but then, reverting to her original attitudes, rejects the outcome that
the process recommends acts manipulatively and violates the trust of her
opponent, thereby escalating the dispute by introducing an element of bad
faith. Most disputants naturally shrink back from such an escalation, and
the legal process leverages this attitude-the natural good faith of
disputants-in support of the legitimacy of its outcomes, including
outcomes that disputants initially opposed. But in order to function in this
way, the legal process must welcome rather than estrange the disputants
who might engage it. If, as Lon Fuller observes, "the distinguishing
characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it confers on the affected
party a peculiar form of participation in the decision,"'' 0 0 then "[w]hatever
heightens the significance of this participation lifts adjudication toward its
optimum expression," which is to say, increases the legal process's
legitimacy.10 1 And because lawyers provide the principal connection
between disputants and the legal process, the burden of inviting disputants
to engage the legal process, and of sustaining disputants' participation, falls
principally on them. In order successfully to shoulder this burden, lawyers
must deny the potentially alienating features of adjudication (in particular,
the legal process's divided sympathies) any foothold within the lawyer-
client relation itself; instead, they must structure the lawyer-client relation
so that they are able, through it, to "bring[] the client's case in a
nonjudgmental way to the authoritative institutions of the society."'01 2 Only
lawyers whose approach to their profession is in some measure adversarial
can achieve this, and adversary advocates are therefore necessary for
sustaining the transformations in disputants' attitudes on which the
legitimacy of the legal process depends. 103
100. Fuller, supra note 69, at 364 (emphasis added).
101. Id.
102. Stuart A. Scheingold, Taking Weber Seriously: Lawyers, Politics, and the Liberal
State, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1061, 1063 (1999).
103. This movement of thought, incidentally, suggests a new reason for condemning the
unequal distribution of legal services that the legal profession provides. Because disputants
who are not led to the legal process by loyal counsel are unlikely to experience the
transformations in their attitudes on which the legitimacy of the process depends, and are
doubly unlikely to experience transformations that can survive rational reflection, an unequal
distribution of lawyers threatens the legitimacy of the legal process.
But this approach to inequality in legal assistance differs in an important way from the
criticisms that dominate the literature, specifically in that it replaces the conventional focus
on the injustice that results when some disputants have more and better lawyers than others
with a focus on legitimacy. This difference in emphasis, moreover, has policy implications.
There is a tendency, in traditional criticisms, to respond to inequality in legal services by
recommending a retreat from adversary advocacy, on the grounds that less aggressive
lawyers will have fewer opportunities to exploit opponents who lack legal representation and
will therefore be less able to secure unjust advantages for their clients. But the argument
here reveals that this is a mistake: Insofar as the legal process's transformative powers are
essential to its legitimacy and adversary lawyers are essential to the legal process's
transformative powers, abandoning adversary advocacy will undermine the authority of
adjudication. Justice is secondary to legitimacy in political life, and there can accordingly be
no substitute for securing adversary representation for all disputants.
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CONCLUSION
"[T]he primary function of the legal system," Parsons observes, "is
integrative."'' 0 4 The law "serves to mitigate potential elements of conflict
and to oil the machinery of social intercourse." 10 5  Moreover, this
integrative function is essential to social coordination. "It is, indeed, only
by adherence to a system of rules that systems of social interaction can
function without breaking down into overt or chronic covert conflict."' 106
The law integrates through the transformative powers of the legal
process, which operates through the efforts of the lawyers who administer
the legal process and invite disputants to engage it. And lawyers can
successfully invite litigants to engage the legal process (and open
themselves up to the transformations that the process engenders) only if
they themselves resist judging their clients-only, that is, if they serve their
clients loyally. Partisan advocacy is therefore revealed to lie at the very
center of the law's claim to legitimacy-as a retail analog to the democratic
virtues that are so notoriously celebrated throughout the civilized world.
Thus, it has even been said,
Viewed in this light, the role of the lawyer as a partisan advocate
appears not as a regrettable necessity, but as an indispensable part of a
larger ordering of affairs. The institution of advocacy is not a concession
to the frailties of human nature, but an expression of human insight in the
design of a social framework within which man's capacity for impartial
judgment can attain its fullest realization.107
It is often said that lawyers, especially in a democratic society, should
respect the legitimate authority of the law, by which is meant the wholesale
authority of lawmaking, and that this requires lawyers, in their work, to
attend to law's broader purposes. But lawyers should also respect the
freestanding authority of the law in its retail application, in and around
adjudication, and if the argument presented here is correct, this requires that
they restrain, in some meaningful measure, their personal views of the law's
internal purposes and, as partisans, assist clients who wish it in acting as
bad men.
104. Parsons, supra note 68, at 58.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference on Professional Responsibility, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958) (reporting on the
Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association and the
Association of American Law Schools).
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